The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China
Shirk, Susan L. UCPress, 2013
꽤 오래 전에 나왔지만, 개혁개방 논의에 있어 여전히 유의미한 책
덩샤오핑의 80년대 초반 개혁 착수 논의에 집중한다
정치개혁 없는 경제개혁을 실행한 중국 사례를 반대의 경로를 택한 소련과 비교하고,
중국정치의 제도에서 개혁 정책의 방향을 찾는다
경제개혁은 필수적으로 승자와 패자를 발생시키므로
기존 제도에서 이익을 얻던 이들 대신 개혁으로 이들을 얻는 이들을 지지기반으로 만들어내고-성정부
국영기업, 가격 등 어려운 개혁은 뒤로 미루어 기존 이익을 보던 중공업의 이익을 보호했다고
중국 개혁과정이 전체적인 정책 하에 이루어진 것은 아니나, 정치제도가 위와 같은 개혁정책을 만들어냈다는 것이 요지다
합의에 의한 결정, 당정간 상호책임주의 reciprocal accountability의 존재, 정으로의 경제정책 권한 이임 등을 배경으로 playing the local'을 추진한 결과
경제적 효율성과 정치적 안정성을 모두 잡았다
-개혁 초기의 얘기고 광범위한 개혁이 필요해 기존 이해집단을 침해할 수 밖에 없는 90년대 이후에는 설득력이 떨어질 수 있다
-정책 과정에 집중하기 때문에, 아래로부터의 개혁 압력에 대해서는 다루지 않는다
중화학공업 우선 노선에서 농업과 경공업이 부서 수가 적은 것처럼 가장 취약한 반대세력이라는 점
노동조합, 여성연합이 협상영역에 참가하지 않았기에 당연히 개혁이 노동자, 여성에게 적대적이었다는 점 등은 소소하게 흥미로운 부분
기본적으로는 관료정치 모델-CCP가 모든 정보를 다 알 수 없으며, 구체적인 정책 수립을 하지 못함-에 근거하며
각 부서의 이익을 대표하는 조직간 경쟁이 정책을 발생시킨 주요 원인으로 작용한다
정책 결정공간으로 성과 부서 책임자가 둘 다 참여하는 (확대)공작회의를 자주 사용했으며,
기본적으로는 중국보다 훨씬 사회주의 제도화 수준이 높은 북한에서 개혁이 어렵다는 점을 시사하지만
부서 통합과 위원회 설립 등이 개혁 장애물 여부를 반영할 수 있다는 점을 북한에 적용 가능
또는
이해관계 측면에서 시장화에 이익을 가진 그룹과 나머지 그룹을 분류할 수 있다
interest and incentive에 주목해서 정리해볼 필요
이익집단 정치와 관료정치 모델을 구분해서 정리해 두어야겠다
이 책처럼 당정 관계자 인터뷰가 가능하면, 북한 경제개혁의 오락가락도 같은 방식으로 정리 가능할듯
1. Based on the “law of anticipated reactions,” policies emerging from the government bureaucracy reflect the preferences of party leaders.
2. If the party leadership is divided and the party's line is changeable, then government reform policies are likely to shift or be inconsistent.
3. Whenever the composition and preferences of the party leadership change, government policies will change too.
4. Because of the party's policepatrol oversight from within the government bureaucracy, party vetoes of policies made in the government arena are rare. The heads of government commissions, ministries, and provinces know from their participation in highlevel party meetings what party leaders would find acceptable and what they would not; because their careers depend on pleasing party leaders, they will not promulgate policies of which party leaders would disapprove.
1. Leaders promote policies that appeal to groups in the selectorate.
2. Potential successors promote policies that conform with the preferences of the incumbent preeminent leader
3. Whenever the selectorate is redefined (say, by cutting out the elders or the military leaders not in the Central Committee), government policies will change as well.
4. Because leaders are chosen by an elite selectorate, not a mass electorate, policy benefits are concentrated on officials instead of ordinary citizens.
5. When the leadership is unified, the Central Committee normally ratifies the leadership's policy decisions. But when the leadership is divided by succession competition, the Central Committee may become the bargaining arena.
6. During succession struggles, groups represented in the Central Committee are able to extract more resources than they can during periods when the leadership authority is consolidated and unified. Contending leaders promote policies that transfer authority and resources to groups in the selectorate and avoid policies that retract benefits.
7. Contenders for power promote policy formulas based on selective allocation, which enable them to build a network of supporters, instead of policy formulas based on universal rules.
1. Officials press for policies that satisfy the interests of their own commission, ministry, or province.
2. Policymaking is highly contentious. Conflicts between ministries and provinces are frequent and difficult to resolve.
3. Decisionmaking is slow and inefficient, especially when policies that involve redistribution are being considered.
1. Policies hammered out without the participation of certain groups do not incorporate the preferences of these groups.
2. Underrepresented sectors (such as agriculture) receive a relatively small share of resources, while overrepresented sectors (such as heavy industry) receive the lion's share.
3. If the bureaucratic configuration remains the same, then the shares of resources will also remain the same.
4. Bureaucratic reorganizations will change the pattern of resource allocation.
5. Policy innovations occur when bureaucratic reorganizations enfranchise or strengthen the representation of new groups and disenfranchise or weaken the representation of groups favored by previous policies.
6. Party authorities can also achieve policy innovations by shifting policymaking to a different arena (e.g., work conferences, legislatures, party bodies) or, more rarely, by imposing the innovations over the heads of the bureaucracy.
1. Policy decisions are more difficult and timeconsuming and require more side payments than they do under majority rule.
2. Policies emerging from this kind of system tend to be incremental because participants will veto proposals that make them substantially worse off than they are
under the status quo.
3. Highly redistributive issues are postponed or fail to pass unless the authorities impose them on bureaucratic subordinates.
4. The larger and less stable the set of participants, the more elusive is policy consensus
5. When the authorities are divided and their preferences uncertain, agents are less willing to compromise and agreement on policies is more difficult to achieve.
